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Abstract 
Prior research on auditor’s remuneration has shown mixed evidence on the association between ownership 
structures and auditor’s remuneration. Previous studies have also documented relationship between board 
independence and audit fee. However, there is dearth of studies on these aspects in context of India which is 
dominated by family owned business groups and has seen significant changes in corporate governance norms in 
last decade. The present study examines the association of promoter’s ownership, institutional ownership and 
board independence together with auditor’s remuneration. The study takes a sample of 96 firm years. The results 
of the study suggest that there is a positive and significant association of promoter’s ownership and institutional 
ownership with auditor’s remuneration. However, there is no conclusive evidence on the relationship between 
board independence and auditor’s remuneration. The results are consistent to various robustness tests. 
Keywords: Ownership structure, Promoter’s shareholding, Institutional shareholding, Board independence, 
Audit fee, Auditor’s remuneration 
 
1. Introduction 
Transparency in financial reporting and earnings quality has been a matter of considerable debate and research in 
last two decades. The research in this domain particularly has gained momentum post the Enron debacle. Case of 
Satyam Computer Services in India has also raised similar issues. The fundamental issue in these cases was 
corporate governance to tackle agency problem. Typically, agency problem arises when there is a conflict 
between the principal and the agent. In modern corporations, this refers to conflict between shareholders and 
managers, where managers are considered as the agent of shareholders. Agency conflict leads to managerial 
opportunism where the managers may have incentives to take actions that are in their personal well-being rather 
than that of the firm or its shareholders. Misreporting the financials is an example of such an action. 
 In order to control for agency problem, shareholders incur agency cost. One of the components of 
agency cost is the monitoring cost such as audit fees paid to external auditors for providing an external and 
independent view on the financial statements of the firm. However, this monitoring cost may be reduced by 
improving on firm’s internal governance structures for example appointing independent directors (Fama & 
Jensen, 1983) and monitoring by large shareholders (Schleifer & Vishny, 1986). Adam et al (1997) argue that 
pricing of audit fees depends on monitoring costs of auditors. Auditors may exert more time and effort if they 
foresee higher agency problem with relatively weaker internal governance. 
Mitra et al (2007) argue that the pricing of audit fees in relation with internal monitoring may be 
explained from two perspectives viz. the demand side perspective and the supply side perspective.  
The demand side perspective suggests that “governance mechanisms require high-quality audit to 
mitigate agency costs” (Mitra et al, 2007, pp.258). For example, the board of directors may be motivated to 
demand high quality audit in order to protect their reputation (Stewart & Munro, 2007; Boo & Sharma, 2008). 
Similarly, large shareholders (promoters and/or institutional shareholders) may require tighter monitoring and 
therefore will solicit extensive audit (O’Sullivan, 2000). This leads to higher efforts on the part of auditors and 
thereby leads to higher audit fees. In summary, the demand-side perspective posit that stronger the internal 
governance mechanisms and more concentration of ownership requires higher quality audits and therefore leads 
to higher audit fees. 
The supply side perspective suggests that since the “governance factors mitigate agency problems in 
financial reporting and reduce the risk of accounting misstatements or irregularities” (Mitra et al , 2007 pp.258), 
the overall audit risk reduces leading to a reduction in audit fees. In other words, the auditor assesses the extent 
of agency problem and its impact on financial reporting, depending upon the internal corporate governance 
factors such as independence of board and likelihood of active monitoring by the large shareholders. For a firm 
characterized by the more independent board and high monitoring by promoters and institutional shareholders, 
the auditor may perceive lower audit risk and therefore will price the audit fees low.  
These two conflicting perspectives present the research problem for this study that is to understand as 
to which perspective explains the pricing of audit fee in India. The firms in India are dominated by family owned 
business groups where promoters play a key role in the management of the firm. Going by typical principal-
agent conflict, such firms should not face higher levels of agency problem. However, in such cases firms instead 
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face principal-principal agency conflict, sometimes called as type II agency problem or horizontal agency 
problem. The conflict here arises between majority shareholders and minority shareholders, wherein the majority 
shareholders may expropriate wealth from minority shareholders. The role of promoters in such case becomes 
critical to understand the level of conflict and therefore the auditor’s remuneration. Similarly, it is expected that 
institutional shareholders will provide tight monitoring of activities of the firm. They may do so actively 
participating in the decision making process or by inducing the management to procure extensive auditing 
services or both. That is to say, auditing may complement or substitute monitoring by institutional shareholders. 
Further, last decade and half have seen significant development in corporate governance norms in India. One of 
areas that received large importance was board independence. Placing independent directors in the board of 
directors is expected to provide strict monitoring and reduce agency conflict. In such a case it is interesting to 
find how board independence affect the audit process, which another mechanism for monitoring. 
The objective of this paper is to study the relationship between board independence, ownership 
structure and audit fees in Indian context. The present study extends the previous literature on relationship 
between audit fees, corporate governance, and ownership structures. This study is important for various reasons. 
Firstly, most of the previous research in this domain has been conducted in the context of developed economies 
such United States (US) and United Kingdom (UK) (e.g. O’Sullivan, 2000; Carcello et al, 2002; Abbott et al, 
2003, Mitra et al, 2007). The research in Indian context with regard to audit fees is limited. One significant 
difference between developed economies and emerging economies like India is that developed economies are 
characterized by diffused ownership structures whereas firms in India have exhibit concentrated ownership. It is 
therefore important to understand how ownership concentration affects the audit processes. Further, prior 
literature (e.g. Jian and Wong, 2003 and Leuz et al., 2003) have found that practices of earnings management or 
misreporting of financial statements are more pervasive in emerging economies than in developed economies 
owing to weak legal enforcement system. It is therefore essential to understand how corporate governance 
factors such as independence of board impact the audit quality in India.  
Secondly, corporate governance norms in India have undergone substantial changes in the last decade. 
Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI) constituted multiple national level committees in late 1990s and early 
2000. Major of them were Kumar Mangalam Birla Committee, Naresh Chandra  Committee and Narayan 
Murthy Committee. Based on the recommendations of Kumar Managalam Committee, SEBI encated clause 49 
of the listing agreement. This clause is considered as the major milestone in the history of corporate governance 
in India. Later, upon the recommendations of Narayan Murthy Committee, cause 49 was amended with effect 
from 2006. One of the areas that were given utmost importance was the independence of board. The clause 
requires that board of directors of a listed company should have at least fifty percent non-executive directors. 
Further, it provides that for every listed company where the chairperson of the board is a non-executive director, 
at least one-third of the board should be independent. In case an executive director occupies the position of the 
chairperson of board, the board should comprise at least fifty percent independent directors. Given the significant 
changes in the corporate governance norms in India, there is a need to understand as to how these changes affect 
the audit quality.  
Lastly, the present study considers characteristics of both the board of directors and the ownership 
structure together to analyze the impact on audit fees. Using large number of control variables, this study sheds 
light on the effect of board independence and ownership concentration. 
 This study uses a sample of 96 firm years representing 32 firms over a period of three years. These 
firms are part of the broad-based CNX Nifty Index on National Stock Exchange of India. The present study 
examines the relationship of promoter’s shareholding, institutional shareholding and board independence with 
auditor’s remuneration. Promoter’s shareholding is measured as a proportion of shares held by the promoter 
group to the total shares issued by the firm. Similarly, institutional shareholding is measured by proportion of 
shares held by institutional shareholders to total shares issued by the firm. Board independence is measured y the 
proportion of independent directors in the board of the firm. Auditor’s remuneration is measure in two ways viz. 
audit fee paid to the auditor and total fee paid to the auditor which includes audit fee, fee for company law 
matters, the fees for taxation matters and consultancy fees. Robustness test are performed, first to control for size 
effect and second for alternate measure of ownership. 
The results of the study suggest that there is a positive and significant association between promoter’s 
shareholding and auditor’s remuneration, and between institutional shareholding and auditor’s remuneration. 
However, the study finds no conclusive evidence on the association between board independence and auditor’s 
remuneration. The results are consistent with demand perspective of the auditor’s remuneration and suggest that 
large shareholders (promoters as well as institutions) solicit for high quality and extensive audit leading to higher 
auditor’s remuneration. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related literature and describes the 
hypothesis. Section 3 provides the sample data description, variables and research methodology. Section 4 
discussed the results and section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2. Literature review and hypothesis development 
Prior studies on audit research (Gul and Tsui, 2001; Carcello et al, 2002; Abbott et al, 2003; Larcker and 
Richardson, 2004; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2009) have investigated the relationship between corporate 
governance factors, and audit quality and audit fees. The basic premise in these studies is the agency problem 
which suggests managerial opportunism, including misreporting the financial results, due to separation of 
ownership from management (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Few studies have analyzed the effect of institutional 
ownership on the level of audit fees. Mitra et al (2007) examines the relationship between ownership 
characteristics and audit fees, and finds a significant positive relationship between diffused institutional 
shareholding and audit fees. They also document a significant negative relationship between institutional block-
holder ownership and audit fees. They argue that institutional shareholders pressurize firms for high quality 
financial reporting and therefore high quality audit that leads to an increase in audit fees. However, presence of 
the institutional block-holders reduces the audit risk because of increased monitoring by such block-holders, and 
therefore, audit fees reduces with increase in institutional block-holders. Lim et al (2013) argue that institutional 
investors monitor financial reporting quality due to reputation and potential litigation concerns. They find that as 
the non-audit fees increase, the audit quality decreases but only for firms which have low institutional ownership 
and not for firms having high institutional ownership. Similarly, Velury et al. (2003) and Kane and Velury (2004) 
find that institutional investors tend to induce management of the auditee firm to appoint high-quality auditor in 
order to increase the quality of the financial statements. 
Based on the above literature our first hypothesis (presented in null form) is as below. 
H1: There is no significant association between institutional shareholding and audit fees 
It has been argued that managerial ownership may reduce the agency conflict (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). In that sense, higher managerial ownership will reduce the audit risk and the audit fees. Peel and 
Clatworthy (2001) have documented higher director shareholdings have significant negative association with 
audit fees. In a similar vein, Gul et al. (2003) also find that managerial ownership moderates the positive 
relationship between abnormal accruals and audit fees. Niemi (2005) finds that for firms where managers have 
majority shareholding tend to consume less of auditor’s time and therefore are associated with lower audit fees. 
Lin and Liu (2013) finds a non-linear relationship between managerial shareholding and audit fees. They find a 
negative association between managerial ownership and audit fees in low and high regions of managerial 
shareholding but a negative relationship in the intermediate region. 
The above findings hold good in case of countries where the ownership structures are dispersed. Firms 
in India, however, are dominated by family business groups and concentrated ownerships. In such situations, 
typical principal-agent conflict is less important as majority shareholders are generally the managers of the firm. 
Firms, instead, face type II agency problem i.e. principal-principal conflict, where the majority shareholders may 
benefit at the cost of minority shareholders. Prior research has shown that ownership structures can have 
significant impact on quality and transparency of financial reports due to insider influence (e.g. Haw et al.,2004; 
Ball and Shivakumar, 2005).     
Fan and Wong (2005) examine whether auditors perform corporate governance role in emerging 
markets where the ownership structure are highly concentrated. They argue that concentrated ownerships may 
lead to entrenchment where the controlling shareholders may expropriate wealth at the cost of minority 
shareholders. However, minority shareholders recognize this problem and generally discount the share price. In 
such situations, the controlling shareholders would try to reduce the agency conflict provided the cost to reduce 
the conflict is lower than the benefit derived. One way to reduce the conflict is to hire high quality (big 5) 
auditors. Using a sample from eight east-asian countries, they find that firms with high agency conflict due to 
concentrated ownership are more likely to hire big 5 auditors. Rusmin et al (2009) investigate association 
between corporate governance and ownership concentration influence audit fee pricing. Using a sample of 296 
firms listed in Australia, Hong Kong and Malaysia, they find that higher ownership concentration are associated 
with lower audit fees. They argue that their results support supply-side perspective which suggests that higher 
ownership concentration improves internal control and compliance leading to auditor’s perception of low audit 
risk which in turn leads to low audit fees. Auditing being an agency cost borne by the shareholders to reduce 
information asymmetry (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), ownership structures are likely to influence audit effort 
and risk. 
Based on the above literature our second hypothesis (presented in null form) is as below. 
H2: There is no significant association between promoter’s shareholding and audit fees 
Prior literature on relationship between corporate governance and external auditing argues that board 
independence and audit quality are complementary in the sense that a more independent board seeks for rigorous 
external audit. Carcello et al (2202) argue that directors seek for their liability and reputation protection, and 
therefore demand extensive audit. Similarly, O’Suvllivan (2000) argues that non-executive directors are 
expected to prefer rigorous external audit to complement their own monitoring.  
Based on the above literature our second hypothesis (presented in null form) is as below. 
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H3: There is no significant association between board independence and audit fees 
 
3. Methodology 
3.1. Data Sample 
The sample for this study consists of all firms forming part of CNX Nifty Index for three financial years viz. 
financial year ending on Mar 31, 2012, Mar 31, 2013 and Mar 31, 2014. This index is a portfolio of 50 well-
diversified stocks accounting for 23 sectors of the Indian economy. This index is widely used for benchmarking, 
index derivatives, and index funds. Since government firms may not encounter the typical agency problem, the 
firms belonging to Government sector have been eliminated from the sample. Further, consistent with the prior 
literature, firms belonging to financial sector are also eliminated as they are subject to different regulatory 
requirement. The final sample consists of 32 private non-financial companies forming part of CNX Nifty Index. 
The data for these companies for three financial years has been obtained from Prowess database maintained by 
Center for Monitoring Indian Economy (CMIE). Prowess is one of the most widely used databases in academic 
research in India. The final sample consists of 32 firms for three financial years making the sample of 96 firm-
years.  
 
3.2. Variables 
The objective of this paper is to study the relationship between board independence, ownership structure and 
audit fees. The dependent variable in this study is the audit fees (AUDFEE). To avoid issues heteroskedasticity, 
we use natural log of audit fees paid by the firm to the auditors. In an additional analysis, we also use the total 
fees (TOTFEE) paid to the auditors which include the audit fees, the fees for company law matters, the fees for 
taxation matters and consultancy fees.  
There are three independent variables used in this study. The first variable is the proportion of 
independent directors in the board of the company (PID). This variable has been used to test the first hypothesis 
of the study, which examines the relationship between board independence and audit fees. For testing the 
relationship between ownership structure and audit fees, two variables have been used viz. the percentage 
holding of promoter’s (PROMO) and the percentage holding of institutional investors (INS). These two variables 
are used to test the second and the third hypotheses of the study. 
Consistent with prior literature (e.g. see Gul and Tsui, 1998; Chan et al, 1993; Cobbin, 2002; Naser 
and Nuseibeh, 2007), the present study uses large number of control variables. These control variables are 
included to control for corporate size, audit complexity, audit risk and auditor quality. For corporate size, three 
variables are considered. These include  
• natural log of total assets (SIZE) 
• the level of free cash flows measured by free cash flow scaled by total assets (FCF) and  
• the age of firm measured by natural log of number of years since the firm has been listed on National 
Stock Exchange (AGE). 
In order to control for audit complexity number of control variables are included. These include  
• receivables to total asset ratio (REC),  
• current ratio (CR),  
• inventory to total assets ratio (INV),  
• price to book ratio (PBR),  
• number of subsidiaries (SUB) and  
• association with a business group (GRP) measured using a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm 
belongs to a business group else 0.  
For the purposes of controlling audit risk, three control variables are considered. These variables include  
• negative cash flow which is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has experienced 
negative operating cash flows in any of the previous three years (NEGCF) 
• leverage measured by total term liabilities scaled by total assets (LEV), and 
• return on assets (ROA) 
Audit quality is controlled by including a dummy variable (BIG4) that takes the value of 1 if the firm 
is audited by a big 4 auditor else 0. 
In all 13 control variables are included to ensure that there is no spurious association established 
between dependent and the independent variables. 
Table 1 provides the list of all variables and their definitions. 
 
3.3 Methodology 
Consistent with previous research on audit fees (e.g. Carcello et al, 2002; Boo & Sharma, 2008) cross sectional 
regression has been used in the present study to examine the association of board independence and ownership 
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structure with audit fees. Below is the regression model estimated in this study: 
AUDFEE = α0 + β1PROMO + β2INS + β3PID + β4SIZE + β5FCF + β6AGE + β7REC + β8CR + β9INV + 
β10PBR + β11SUB + β12GRP + β13NEGCF + β14LEV + β15ROA + β16BIG4   (1) 
In an additional analysis, the study also examines the relationship of board independence and 
ownership structure with total fee paid to the audit firm. For this purpose, the dependent variable in eq. (1) is 
replaced with TOTFEE. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the sample. Total sample observations for this study are 96. The 
average promoter’s shareholding is 45.93% in the sample whereas the average institutional shareholding is 
34.92%. The high proportion of promoter’s shareholding provides establishes the presence of family owned 
firms with high ownership concentration. This also is ratified by the fact that more than 90% of the firms belong 
to business groups. High institutional shareholding is also present in the sample. On average the firms in the 
sample have approximately 50% of independent directors in the board. On average the companies have 3.2 
subsidiaries. 6.25% of the firms or six firms out of 96 firms have experienced negative operating cash flows in 
previous three years. More than 80% of the companies are audited by big 4 auditors. On average 9.8% of the 
total assets of the sample firms are financed by term liabilities. The firms in sample have experienced an average 
return on assets of 12.61% with maximum of 37.53% and minimum of negative 0.75%. On average inventory 
comprises 8.9% of total assets and receivables comprises 13.53% of total assets.   
 
4.2. Regression Analysis 
Table 3 presents the results of regression equation (1). Model 1 of the table 3 uses AUDFEE as the dependent 
variable, whereas Model 2 uses TOTFEE as the dependent variable. Both the models include number of control 
variables as described above. 
The result of Model 1shows significant positive relationship between audit fee and promoter’s 
shareholding (coefficient: 1.671; p value < 1%). Similarly, model 2 shows significant positive relationship 
between total fee paid to auditors and promoter’s shareholding (Coefficient: 1.4697; p value <1%). Results also 
show significant positive relationship between institutional shareholding and audit fees (Coefficient:2.6619; p 
value < 5%) and between institutional shareholding and total fees paid to the auditors (Coefficient: 2.9855; p 
value <1%). These results are consistent with the demand-based perspective that suggest that large shareholders 
have more incentive to actively control the management activities and increase transparency in financial 
statements due to their reputation being at stake in case the financial misstatements are discovered later on. 
Therefore, they solicit for high quality audit and additional audit services. Due high quality and additional 
services demanded, the audit remuneration increases.  
The relationship between audit fees and percentage of independent directors is positive but significant 
only at 10% significance level (p value = 8.7%). Moreover, the relationship between percentage of independent 
directors and total fees paid to auditors is insignificant (p value > 5%). These results suggest that higher board 
independence does not affect the level of auditor’s remuneration. A significant positive relationship would have 
suggested that a more independent board solicits for high quality audit leading to increase in auditor’s 
remuneration, consistent with the demand-based perspective. On the other hand, a significant negative 
relationship would have suggested that with higher independence in the board, auditor’s perceive lower audit 
risk leading to lower remuneration, consistent with supply side perspective. However, the results fail to 
document any (positive or negative) significant relationship between board independence and auditor’s 
remuneration.  
With respect to the control variables, the results suggest positive and significant association of 
auditor’s remuneration with size of the firm, level of inventory it holds, affiliation to a business group and 
presence of a big 4 auditor. 
Based on the above results, hypothesis 1 and hypothesis 2 are rejected. That is to say auditor’s 
remuneration is positively associated with both institutional shareholding and promoter’s shareholding. However, 
the results fail to reject the hypothesis 3 that posit that there is no relationship between board independence and 
auditor’s remuneration. 
 
4.3. Robustness Check 
4.3.1. Control for size effect 
In order to control for size effect, the auditor’s remuneration is deflated with value of total assets. In other words, 
a ratio of audit fee to total assets and alternatively a ratio of total fee paid to auditors to total asset are computed. 
This ratio is then regressed against the independent and control variables. The results of the regression are 
presented in table 4. 
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The results have largely remained same. Although the coefficient values are much smaller, however, the 
relationships observed have remained constant and significant. The association of promoter’s shareholding with 
deflated audit fees (and alternatively with deflated total fees) is positive and significant at 5% significance level. 
Similarly, the association of institutional shareholding with deflated audit fees (and alternatively with deflated 
total fees) is also positive and significant at 5% level, which is same as that in the original results. The 
relationship between board independence and auditor’s remuneration (in case of both audit fee and total fee) 
remains insignificant. 
4.3.2. Additional test for ownership structure 
To test for robustness of results pertaining to promoter’s and institutional shareholding, an additional test is 
performed wherein instead of taking shareholding (both promoter and institutional) as continuous variable, they 
are transformed into categorical variables. In order to do the transformation, a reference to the distribution of 
shareholding is made. The promoter’s shareholding is widely distributed with minimum of 0% and maximum of 
78.6%. The mean lies at 45.9% and the median lies at 50.15%. The institutional shareholding is relatively less 
widely spread with minimum value of 10.1% and maximum of 58%. The average institutional shareholding is 
34.9% which close to its median value at 34.4%. Considering the distribution of promoter’s and institutional 
shareholding, the promoter’s shareholding is classified into three categories i.e. below 1
st
 quartile, between 1
st
 
quartile and 3
rd
 quartile, and more than 3
rd
 quartile. Whereas, since institutional shareholding is less widely 
dispersed, it is classified into two categories using its median value. Based on these categorization two dummy 
variables are introduced for promoter’s shareholding i.e. PROMO_1 that takes the value of 1 if the shareholding 
is between 1
st
 quartile and 3
rd
 quartile else 0, and PROMO_2 that takes the value of 1 if the promoter’s 
shareholding is more than 3
rd
 quartile else 0. For institutional shareholding, one dummy variable (INS_1) is 
introduced that takes the value of 1 if the institutional shareholding is more than its median value else it takes the 
value 0. Regression analysis is then performed using the categorical variables for ownership instead of 
continuous variables. Table 5 reports the results. 
The results of the regression analysis using categorized ownership data are similar to our original 
results. The association of promoter’s shareholding with both audit fee and total fee remain positive and highly 
significant. Similarly, the association of institutional shareholding with auditor’s remuneration is again positive 
and significant. Board independence shows significant association with audit fee but not with total fee. Therefore, 
in this case also we do not have conclusive evidence on the relationship between board independence and 
auditor’s remuneration. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The objective of this study was to examine the relationship of ownership structure and board independence with 
auditor’s remuneration. Two conflicting perspective viz. demand based perspective and supply-based perspective, 
exist currently in literature. Demand-based perspective posits that in case of concentrated ownership, the large 
shareholders e.g. promoters or institutions demand rigorous and high quality audit leading to an increase in audit 
fee. Similarly, a highly independent board may also call for additional audit services. Thus with increase in 
promoter’s or institutional shareholding, or with increase in proportion of independent directors in the board, the 
audit fee is expected to increase. Supply-based perspective, on the other hand, posits that with increase in 
promoter’s or institutional shareholding the auditor may perceive presence of effective monitoring and therefore 
assess a low audit risk. This will lead to low pricing of audit fee by the auditor. Considering these perspectives, 
this study investigates the relationship of auditor’s remuneration with promoter’s and institutional shareholding, 
and board independence in Indian context. 
Using a sample of 96 firm years, the results of this study suggest that there is a positive and significant 
association between promoter’s shareholding and auditor’s remuneration, and between institutional shareholding 
and auditor’s remuneration. These results support the demand-based perspective on audit fees. These results 
suggest that promoters with high shareholding in the firm or institutional shareholders induce firms to obtain 
high quality audit services leading to higher auditor’s remuneration. However, this study does not find any 
conclusive evidence on relationship of board independence and auditor’s remuneration. In other words, based on 
the sample there is no effect of proportion of independent directors in the board on the auditor’s remuneration. 
These results suggest that neither independent directors solicit high quality audit (demand-based perspective) nor 
auditor perceives presence of independent director as an assurance of low audit risk (supply-side perspective). In 
this context it may be worth mentioning that prior literature on earnings management and corporate governance 
also document conflicting evidence on the effect of proportion of independent directors on earnings management. 
For example, Xie et al (2003), Klein (2002), Beasley (1996) and Davidson et al (2005) find that there is negative 
relationship between proportion of independent directors and earnings management. However, Peasnell et al 
(2005), Bradbury et al (2006), Sarkar et al (2008)and Rajpal (2012) found no significant association between 
earnings management and board independence. The results of the present study provides only limited evidence 
(in Model 5 and partially in Model 1) on the positive relationship between board independence and auditor’s 
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remuneration. The result of present study therefore corroborate to the conflicting findings on earnings 
management and board independence. The results of the study hold in various robustness checks. 
The study extends, in general,  the literature on audit fee, ownership structure and board independence 
(e.g. Carcello, 2002; Gul et al, 1998; Abott et al, 2003, Mitra et al, 2007, Rusmin et al, 2009). Specifically, this is 
study is useful as it provides initial empirical evidence on association between auditor’s remuneration, ownership 
structure and board independence in the context of Indian companies, which are characterized with family 
owned and managed firms.  
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Table 1: List of Variables and their definitions 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variables   
AUDFEE Natural log of the audit fee paid by a firm to the auditor. 
TOTFEE Natural log of the total fee paid by a firm to the auditor. This includes 
the audit fee, fees for company law matters, fees for taxation matters 
and consultancy fees 
Independent Variables   
PROMO Proportion of shares held by the promoters of the firm 
INS Proportion of shares held by the institutional shareholders 
PID Proportion of independent directors in the firm 
Control Variables   
SIZE Natural log of total assets of the firm 
FCF Free cash flow scaled by total assets of the firm 
AGE Natural log of the years since the firm is listed on National Stock 
Exchange (NSE) of India. 
REC Ratio of receivables to total assets of the firm 
CR Current ratio measured by dividing current assets with current liabilities 
INV Ratio of inventory to total assets of the firm 
PBR Price to book ratio 
SUB Number of subsidiaries of a firm 
GRP Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm is associated with a 
business group, otherwise 0 
NEGCF Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has experience 
negative operating cash flows in any of the previous three years, 
otherwise 0. 
LEV Leverage measured as a ratio of total term liabilities to total assets 
ROA Return on assets measured by dividing profit after tax with total assets 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable N Mean Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation 
AUDFEE 96 16.607 14.914 18.315 .819 
TOTFEE 96 17.004 15.790 18.951 .803 
INS 96 .349 .101 .580 .114 
PROMO 96 .459 .000 .786 .197 
PID 96 .499 .150 .769 .107 
NEGCF 96 .063 .000 1.000 .243 
SIZE 96 26.240 24.297 28.933 .958 
REC 96 .135 .000 .463 .116 
INV 96 .089 .000 .279 .077 
CR 96 1.202 .160 4.580 .866 
PBR 96 5.504 .520 39.970 6.320 
LEV 96 .098 .000 .378 .114 
ROA 96 12.607 -.750 37.530 9.004 
FCF 96 .019 -.244 .310 .069 
SUB 96 3.282 .000 6.708 1.399 
GRP 96 .906 .000 1.000 .293 
AGE 96 2.662 1.348 2.966 .423 
BIG4 96 .802 .000 1.000 .401 
 
Table 3: Regression Analysis 
  Model 1 Model 2 
  Dependent Var. = AUDFEE Dependent Var. = TOTFEE 
Intercept -6.4106** 
(-2.2245) 
-8.5624*** 
(-3.5365) 
INS 2.6619** 
(2.251) 
2.9855*** 
(3.0049) 
PROMO 1.671*** 
(2.6517) 
1.4697*** 
(2.7759) 
PID 1.03* 
(1.7311) 
0.2149 
(0.4299) 
NEGCF -0.2832 
(-1.1358) 
-0.2489 
(-1.188) 
SIZE 0.7194*** 
(7.352) 
0.815*** 
(9.9137) 
REC 0.0751 
(0.0992) 
0.6702 
(1.0532) 
INV 2.5137** 
(2.2758) 
3.2606*** 
(3.5135) 
CR -0.0869 
(-0.9464) 
-0.0937 
(-1.2148) 
PBR 0.0231 
(1.6054) 
0.0227* 
(1.882) 
LEV -1.0704 
(-1.398) 
-1.1321* 
(-1.7598) 
ROA -0.0014 
(-0.1297) 
-0.0018 
(-0.1892) 
FCF 1.6403* 
(1.7181) 
1.2198 
(1.5207) 
SUB 0.0845 
(1.4263) 
0.0628 
(1.2615) 
GRP 0.5255** 
(2.0707) 
0.8485*** 
(3.9794) 
AGE 0.1535 
(0.816) 
0.1703 
(1.0777) 
BIG4 0.7731*** 
(4.1093) 
0.8209*** 
(5.1935) 
No. of Observations 96 96 
F-Stat 9.987 15.393 
Sig. of F 0.000 0.000 
R-sq 0.669 0.757 
Adj R-Sq 0.602 0.708 
Highest VIF 6.518 6.518 
t-stat in parentheses. ‘***’, ‘**’, and ‘*’ indicate that the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
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Table 4: Regression analysis using deflated auditor’s remuneration 
  
Model 3 Model 4 
Dependent Var. = AUDFEE/Total Assets 
Dependent Var. = TOTFEE/Total 
Assets 
Intercept 18.368 x 10
-5 
(0.705) 
-5.305 x 10
-5
 
(-0.166) 
INS 25.204 x 10
-5
**
 
(2.357) 
51.135 x 10
-5
*** 
(3.908) 
PROMO 13.678 x 10
-5
**
 
(2.4) 
23.689 x 10
-5
*** 
(3.398) 
PID 3.646 x 10
-5 
(0.678) 
-1.996 x 10
-5
 
(-0.303) 
NEGCF -2.139 x 10
-5 
(-0.949) 
-1.91 x 10
-5
 
(-0.692) 
SIZE -1.536 x 10
-5
*
 
(-1.736) 
-1.22 x 10
-5
 
(-1.127) 
REC 2.437 x 10
-5 
(0.356) 
8.236 x 10
-5
 
(0.983) 
INV 17.72 x 10
-5
*
 
(1.774) 
41.314 x 10
-5
*** 
(3.381) 
CR -0.545 x 10
-5 
(-0.657) 
-0.333 x 10
-5
 
(-0.327) 
PBR 0.406 x 10
-5
***
 
(3.124) 
0.728 x 10
-5
*** 
(4.582) 
LEV -9.945 x 10
-5 
(-1.436) 
-13.321 x 10
-5
 
(-1.572) 
ROA -0.12 x 10
-5 
(-1.195) 
-0.152 x 10-5 
(-1.235) 
FCF 14.899 x 10
-5
*
 
(1.726) 
19.143 x 10
-5
* 
(1.812) 
SUB 0.095 x 10
-5 
(0.177) 
0.063 x 10
-5
 
(0.097) 
GRP 5.086 x 10
-5
**
 
(2.216) 
9.79 x 10
-5
*** 
(3.486) 
AGE 1.705 x 10
-5 
(1.003) 
0.841 x 10
-5
 
(0.404) 
BIG4 4.203 x 10
-5
**
 
(2.47) 
7.013 x 10
-5
*** 
(3.369) 
No. of Observations 96 96 
F-Stat 7.836 12.882 
Sig. of F 0.000 0.000 
R-sq 0.613 0.723 
Adj R-Sq 0.535 0.667 
Highest VIF 6.518 6.518 
t-stat in parentheses. ‘***’, ‘**’, and ‘*’ indicate that the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
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Table 5: Regression analysis using categorized ownership 
  
Model 5 Model 6 
Dependent Var. = AUDFEE Dependent Var. = TOTFEE 
Intercept -5.311** 
(-2.428) 
-5.867*** 
(-3.007) 
PROMO_1 0.909*** 
(5.319) 
0.71*** 
(4.654) 
PROMO_2 0.917*** 
(4.463) 
0.598*** 
(3.262) 
INS_1 0.507*** 
(3.056) 
0.304** 
(2.053) 
PID 1.338** 
(2.569) 
0.332 
(0.714) 
NEGCF -0.273 
(-1.24) 
-0.257 
(-1.305) 
REC -0.964 
(-1.421) 
-0.226 
(-0.374) 
INV 1.366 
(1.355) 
1.967** 
(2.188) 
CR -0.025 
(-0.318) 
-0.028 
(-0.396) 
PBR 0.019 
(1.488) 
0.015 
(1.355) 
LEV -0.889 
(-1.308) 
-0.747 
(-1.234) 
ROA 0.013 
(1.24) 
0.012 
(1.278) 
FCF 1.08 
(1.262) 
0.819 
(1.072) 
SUB 0.191*** 
(2.993) 
0.183*** 
(3.219) 
GRP 0.489** 
(2.178) 
0.703*** 
(3.513) 
AGE 0.2 
(1.267) 
0.306** 
(2.176) 
BIG4 0.633*** 
(3.793) 
0.705*** 
(4.739) 
SIZE 0.688*** 
(8.198) 
0.73*** 
(9.749) 
No. of Observations 96 96 
F-Stat 13.637 17.44 
Sig. of F 0.000 0.000 
R-sq 0.748 0.792 
Adj R-Sq 0.693 0.746 
Highest VIF 3.91 3.91 
t-stat in parentheses. ‘***’, ‘**’, and ‘*’ indicate that the coefficient is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% 
respectively. 
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